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On May 23, 2019, Wikileaks founder Julian Assange was indicted in 
the Eastern District of Virginia for allegedly conspiring with Chelsea 
Manning to leak classified information in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 793 et 
seq.1 This indictment marks the first time since the passage of the Espionage 
Act of 1917 (“the Act”)2 that the government has used the Act to prosecute 
a news publisher. Because the activities described in the indictment cannot 
be meaningfully distinguished from traditional journalistic practices, the 
government’s use of the Act in this context has profound implications for 
press freedoms. National security journalists may now face the possibility 
of criminal prosecution for simply doing their jobs.3  
Media leak prosecutions under the Espionage Act have historically been 
infrequent, with the government bringing only four cases in the fifty-year 
period from 1958–2008.4 However, the internet-fueled decentralization of 
news reporting, the War on Terror, and the expanding surveillance state 
have drastically changed the relationship between national security and the 
First Amendment. Since 2009, the government has brought an astounding 
eighteen media leak prosecutions under the Act.5 During the Obama 
administration as well as early in the Trump presidency, the government 
used the Act solely to prosecute whistleblowers and leakers who transmitted 
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1.   Superseding Indictment, United States v. Assange (No. 1:18-cr-111), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1165556/download [https://perma.cc/Z7XG-4UYF].  
2.   18 U.S.C. §§ 793–799. 
3.   See Charlie Savage, Assange Indicted Under Espionage Act, Raising First Amendment 
Issues, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/us/politics/assange-
indictment.html [https://perma.cc/GXB4-N2TC]. 
4.   Gabe Rottman et al., Federal cases involving unauthorized disclosures to the news media, 
1778 to the present, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 
https://www.rcfp.org/resources/leak-investigations-chart/ [https://perma.cc/7SCP-BSZC]. 
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classified information to the press.6 Although the language of the Act 
appears on its face to apply to any actor who publishes classified 
information,7 the Obama administration refrained from using the Act to 
prosecute journalists and news organizations, largely due to First 
Amendment concerns.8 However, these concerns were not enough to 
prevent the Trump administration from indicting Assange under the Act, 
setting a precedent that will undoubtably have a chilling effect on 
journalistic speech in general and on national security journalism in 
particular.9 
In order to solve the issues presented by the government’s increased use 
of the Espionage Act to prosecute journalistic sources and now journalists 
themselves, Congress will have to take decisive action. The narrowest and 
most drastic solution to the specific problem presented by the Assange 
indictment would be for Congress to eliminate § 793(e) of the Act. This 
would alleviate some of the chilling effect on journalists, who would no 
longer be directly liable for the act of publishing. However, as Professor 
Stephen Vladeck notes, this solution would not solve the problem of 
potential inchoate liability for journalists under the Espionage Act.10 In 
order to solve the wider issues created by the Act, a broader solution is 
needed. In this Note, I will propose a potential statutory framework that 
includes a balancing test between the government’s legitimate interest in 
protecting classified information and the public benefit resulting from the 
disclosure. My proposal would allow courts to differentiate espionage and 
other acts that actually threaten the security of the United States from 
                                                   
6.   Kurt Wimmer & Stephen Kiehl, Prosecution of Journalists Under the Espionage Act? Not 
So Fast, 33 COMM. LAW. 24, 24 (2017). 
7.   18 U.S.C § 793(e) (“Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control 
over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, 
blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or 
information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could 
be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully 
communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts 
to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to 
any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or 
employee of the United States entitled to receive it.”) (emphasis added).  
8.   Wimmer & Kiehl, supra note 6, at 24.  
9.   See, e.g., Laura Poitras, I Am Guilty of Violating the Espionage Act, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/21/opinion/laura-poitras-assange-espionage-act.html 
[https://perma.cc/L3SU-MJNQ] (detailing her own personal experience with the Act’s chilling effect). 
10.   Stephen I. Vladeck, Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework 


















fruitful leaks that serve the public interest. 
Part I of this Note details the historical development of the Espionage 
Act from its inception to the present day and discusses the important cases 
interpreting the Act from The New York Times case in the 70’s through the 
controversial AIPAC case in the 2000’s. Part II analyzes the First 
Superseding Assange Indictment and utilizes the Historical Institutionalist 
toolkit to demonstrate why the present represents a critical juncture that will 
determine how prosecutions under the Espionage Act will be conducted in 
the future. Part III will propose both policy and legal recommendations that 
will protect the freedom of the press and allow news outlets to perform their 





This section details the history of the Espionage Act, starting with its 
enactment and early prosecutions under the Act. Next, I examine the cases 
challenging the constitutionality of the Act before proceeding to modern 
trends in Espionage Act prosecutions. The last part of this section introduces 
Historical Institutionalism (“HI”), which provides the toolkit that I will use 




Shortly after the United States declared war against Germany on April 
6, 1917, Congress moved to enact a law that would severely punish sedition 
in wartime.11 Until that point, only the Sedition Act of 1978, which expired 
in 1801, criminalized treason at the federal level. After intense legislative 
debate, Congress enacted the original Espionage Act, § 3 of which 
proclaimed: 
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully 
make or convey false reports or false statements with intent 
to interfere with the operation or success of the military or 
naval forces of the United States or to promote the success 
                                                   
11.   Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery 
Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 336 (2003). 

















of its enemies and whoever when the United States is at 
war, shall wilfully cause or attempt to cause 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in the 
military or naval forces of the United States, or shall 
wilfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the 
United States, to the injury of the service or of the United 
States shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 
or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.12 
The original Act notably did not include a provision that would have 
allowed the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to directly prosecute journalists 
for sedition.13 Despite President Wilson’s insistence that the “authority to 
exercise censorship over the press . . . is absolutely necessary to the public 
safety,”14 Congress decided not to include the controversial press provision 
requested by the executive, largely due to First Amendment concerns. 
Senator Borah (R–ID) was one of many legislators who voiced criticism of 
the proposed press provision, noting that it “has all the ear marks of a 
dictatorship. It suppresses free speech and does it all in the name of war and 
patriotism.”15 With these concerns in mind, the final version of the Act did 
not include the press provision, instead containing the relatively narrowed 
language quoted above. 
However, even this narrower version of the Act provided ample 
ammunition for the DOJ to prosecute anti-war speech. During World War 
I, the Department used the Espionage Act to prosecute more than 2,000 
individuals for speech that inhibited the war effort, primarily under § 3.16 
Prosecutions under the Espionage Act were more frequent than those under 
any other war law, except for the Selective-Service Act, and resulted in 
more than 1,000 convictions.17 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Shaffer v. United States is representative 
of the legal arguments used in early Espionage Act prosecutions.18 Shaffer 
was accused of mailing a book in violation of the Act. The supposedly 
                                                   
12.   Id. 
13.   Id. at 345. 
14.   Id. at 349. 
15.   Id. at n.57. 
16.   DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 256 (1997). 
17.   See Stone, supra note 11, at 336 (citing DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 1918, 16–17 (1918)). 


















seditious section of the book contained the following passage: “The war 
itself is wrong. Its prosecution will be a crime. There is not a question raised, 
an issue involved, a cause at stake, which is worth the life of one blue-jacket 
on the sea or one khaki-coat in the trenches.”19 The court of appeals affirmed 
Shaffer’s conviction, holding that the “natural and probable tendency and 
effect of the words” ran afoul of the statute because they obstructed 
recruitment, which was a necessary part of the war effort.20 The court further 
found that these natural and probable consequences of Shaffer’s knowing 
act were sufficient to show the willfulness and intentionality required by the 
statute.21 This decision was solidly in line with the majority of courts, who 
routinely allowed juries to decide whether a defendant’s speech violated the 
Act.22  
 
B. Constitutionality of the Espionage Act  
 
The first case to reach the Supreme Court challenging the 
constitutionality of the Act was Schenck v. United States (1919).23 Schenck, 
the General Secretary of the Socialist Party, was charged with printing and 
circulating leaflets that encouraged Americans not to volunteer for the 
draft.24 Schenck argued that his conviction should be overturned and that 
the Espionage Act violated the First Amendment’s protection of his freedom 
of speech and of the press.25 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes 
argued that although the government’s actions may have abridged First 
Amendment freedoms under normal conditions, in this case, the Act was 
restricting words that are “used in such circumstances and are of such a 
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of 
proximity and degree.”26 Under this balancing test, the Court held that in 
this case the government’s compelling interest in national security during 
                                                   
19.   Shaffer, 255 F. at 887. 
20.   Id. 
21.   Id. at 889. 
22.   Stone, supra note 11, at 338. For more examples of war-time prosecutions, see id. at 339–
42.  
23.   Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
24.   Id. at 49. 
25.   Id. 
26.   Id. at 52. 

















wartime outweighed Schenck’s civil liberty interest.27 
After Schenck, it took over twenty years for another Espionage Act case 
to make it up to the Court. In Gorin v. United States (1941), the Court 
addressed whether the Espionage Act was void for vagueness under the test 
established in Connally v. General Construction Co.28 In Connally, the 
Court held that a statute was void for vagueness if its terms were not 
“sufficiently explicit” to inform the public as to what conduct was 
proscribed.29 In Gorin, a U.S. naval officer was accused of leaking defense 
information to the Soviets in violation of the Act. Gorin alleged that the 
phrase “connected with the national defense” was unconstitutionally vague 
because it does not meet Connally’s sufficiently explicit standard.30 The 
Court agreed that the phrase was vague on its face but refused to void the 
statute for vagueness, instead reading into the Act a scienter requirement 
that “requires those prosecuted to have acted in bad faith” and with the intent 
to injure the United States.31 
After Gorin, Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950, which 
amended the Espionage Act of 1917 and gave the Act its current codified 
form.32 The newly codified §§ 793 and 794 adopted the language of § 1 of 
the original Act, and emphasized leaking national security information, 
reflecting the fear at the time of large-scale communist theft of military 
secrets.33 The first major case addressing the newly codified § 793 was New 
York Times Co. v. United States, commonly known as the Pentagon Papers 
case.34 The facts leading up to the Court’s ruling are complicated. Daniel 
Ellsberg was accused of leaking a trove of documents to the Washington 
Post and the New York Times detailing American involvement in Indochina 
leading up to and during the Vietnam War.35 The government originally 
attempted to prosecute Ellsberg under the Espionage Act, but charges were 
                                                   
27.   Id. 
28.   Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 
U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
29.   Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.  
30.   Gorin, 312 U.S. at 26–28. 
31.   Id. at 28. 
32.   Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987, 1003–04 (1950) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)–(e) (2000)). 
33.   Robert D. Epstein, Balancing National Security and Free-Speech Rights: Why Congress 
Should Revise the Espionage Act, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 483, 494 (2007). 
34.   N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 


















dropped after the Watergate scandal revealed the Nixon administration had 
attempted to steal Ellsberg’s medical records.36 Nonetheless, the 
government still attempted to enjoin the Post and Times from publishing 
stories based on the unauthorized disclosure of the classified information. 
The Court ruled in a plurality opinion that the government could not enjoin 
the newspapers from publishing, as such an action would represent an 
unlawful prior restraint on the press.37 While this ruling may appear on its 
face to be a win for press and speech freedom, multiple justices wrote 
concurring opinions that left the door open for potential Espionage Act 
prosecutions after the publication of stories based on a leak.38 In a dissenting 
opinion, Justice Harlan indicated that § 793(e) was unconstitutionally vague 
on its face.39 
Another landmark case challenging the constitutionality of § 793 is 
United States v. Morison.40 In Morison, the defendant was an intelligence 
analyst for the Navy who leaked classified satellite images of a Soviet 
aircraft carrier that was under construction in the Black Sea to journalists.41 
He was convicted under § 793(d) and subsequently appealed on the grounds 
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in its scope.42 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the phrases “relating to the 
national defense” and “not entitled to receive” were unconstitutionally 
vague.43 According to the court, the fact that the statute included the mens 
rea word “willfully” required the prosecution to show that the defendant 
acted intentionally with the knowledge that his actions were against the 
law.44 This specific intent requirement combined with the fact that the 
defendant was an experienced intelligence agent who knew the meaning of 
the phrase “related to the national defense,” confirmed that the language 
was not vague when applied to his particular case.45 Additionally, the court 
held that the government classification scheme provided adequate guidance 
regarding who was and was not entitled to handle classified information, 
                                                   
36.   Id. 
37.   N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 715. 
38.   Id. (Marshall, J., concurring); id. (White, J., concurring). 
39.   Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
40.   United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988). 
41.   Id. at 1061. 
42.   Id. at 1063. 
43.   Id. at 1074–75. 
44.   Id. at 1071. 
45.   Id. at 1072–74. 

















and that this guidance saved the phrase “entitled to receive” from 
vagueness.46 Addressing the overbreadth argument, the court held that the 
statute supported a vital governmental interest, was directly related to 
protecting the vital interest, and was narrowly tailored enough to not sweep 
up a substantial amount of unintended protected speech.47 
In a more recent challenge to the constitutionality of § 793, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia confirmed and clarified the rulings 
in Morison regarding the vagueness and overbreadth objections.48 In United 
States v. Rosen, the district court confirmed that the mens rea component 
served to counter any potential vagueness concerns, and that the 
governmental classification scheme adequately limited the Act’s breadth. 
Multiple prosecutions brought by the Obama DOJ under the Espionage Act 
have also passed constitutional muster.49 
 
C. Recent Prosecutorial Trends 
 
A brief examination of recent pre-Assange recent prosecutions under § 
793 reveals two main trends. First, prosecutions are brought against low-
level government officials but not high-level officials who engage in similar 
conduct. Second, prosecutions are brought only when the leak (or the person 
leaking) portrays the government in an unfavorable light. The prosecution 
of John Kiriakou by the Obama DOJ provides an illustration of these trends 
in action. Kiriakou was convicted under § 793(d) for disclosing information 
related to the CIA’s Extraordinary Rendition Program as well as the names 
of CIA officers involved.50 Kiriakou was a former CIA officer who had 
become an outspoken critic of the post-9/11 practices employed by the 
agency in the Middle East.51 Around the same time that Kiriakou was 
convicted under 793(d), the Obama DOJ was considering another 
prosecution under the Act. In 2014, the DOJ was investigating David 
Petraeus, a retired four-star general and former head of the CIA, for 
                                                   
46.   Id. at 1074. 
47.   Id. at 1076. 
48.   United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
49.   United States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C 2011); United States v. Kiriakou, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112393 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2012). 
50.   Kiriakou, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112393, at *5–7. 




















revealing the names of covert officers and the details of covert operations 
to his biographer.52 Although officials in the Department of Justice claimed 
that the materials could have caused “exceptionally grave damage” to the 
United States, they decided not to charge Petraeus under the Espionage 
Act.53  He eventually pled guilty to a misdemeanor and avoided prison.54 
Although the juxtaposition of these two cases does not prove 
governmental misconduct, it does shed light on the dynamics at work behind 
the prosecutions. In a motion to dismiss, Kiriakou’s attorneys addressed 
many of the important issues regarding prosecutions under the Espionage 
Act. They argued that the government engaged in a selective prosecution of 
Kiriakou in the face of widespread similar activity that went unprosecuted.55 
Kirakou’s attorneys cited leaks to the press about the details and identities 
of the Navy Seals involved in the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden, as well 
as a story by The New York Times detailing cyber-attacks by the United 
States Government that disrupted Iranian nuclear facilities.56 These are 
specific examples of a much more widespread phenomenon. In his 
exhaustive study of the ecosystem of leaks, Professor Pozen cites a Senate 
Intelligence Committee report that determined there were 147 stories 
published on the front pages of the nation’s leading newspapers that relied 
on classified information in the first six months of 1986 alone.57 Despite the 
widespread nature of leaking classified information and the fact that many 
similar leaks went unprosecuted, the court in Kiriakou refused to allow 
discovery into the motivations behind the government’s prosecution.58 
The first Espionage Act prosecution under the Trump administration 
provides further evidence of the political nature of these prosecutions. 
Reality Winner, a former air force officer, was convicted of leaking a 
document to the online news outlet The Intercept which detailed Russian 
                                                   
52.   Adam Goldman, How David Petraeus avoided felony charges and possible prison time, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-david-
petraeus-avoided-felony-charges-and-possible-prison-time/2016/01/25/d77628dc-bfab-11e5-83d4-
42e3bceea902_story.html [https://perma.cc/GY7M-VCU4]. 
53.   Id. 
54.   Id.  
55.   Def. Mot. to Dismiss Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 for Selective and/or Vindictive Prosecution at 
5, United States v. Kiriakou, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112393 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2012) (No. 1:12-cr-127) 
https://fas.org/sgp/jud/kiriakou/062112-dismiss46.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC53-77XK]. 
56.   Id. at 5, 7. 
57.   David E. Pozen. The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones 
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 528–29 (2013). 
58.   United States v. Kiriakou, 898 F. Supp. 2d 921 (E.D. Va. 2012). 

















attempts to hack election infrastructure during the 2016 election.59 Winner’s 
prosecution and subsequent conviction had the appearance of being 
politically motivated. In his released memos, former FBI director James 
Comey recalls a conversation with Trump concerning leaks of classified 
information.60 Trump was concerned with recent leaks, including transcripts 
of his calls with foreign leaders, and urged Comey and the DOJ to more 
aggressively pursue leakers.61 Comey responded that they should “nail one 
to the door as a message.”62 Winner was arrested three months later.63 This 
would appear to be an effort at the highest level of government to chill 
certain types of speech. Additionally, acting consistent with previous 
Espionage Act cases, the Court did not allow Winner to argue that her 
disclosure was in the public interest.64 With this avenue of defense 
unavailable, Winner plead guilty and was sentenced to five years in prison.65 
Although the Winner case has garnered the most media attention, it was 
far from the only prosecution under the Act brought by the Trump 
Department of Justice. Including the Winner case, the Trump DOJ brought 
a total of five prosecutions under the Act. A brief examination of each of 
these cases will help illustrate how the Trump DOJ wielded the Act to 
aggressively target leakers of national security information. The second case 
brought by the Trump DOJ was against Terry Albury, an F.B.I. agent who 
was sentenced to 48 months in prison for leaking classified information 
regarding the Bureau’s methods for recruiting informants and identifying 
potential extremists.66 In court, Albury’s lawyers argued that he came 
forward in an attempt to shed light on what he perceived to be “widespread 
racist and xenophobic sentiments” influencing the Bureau’s tactics.67 In 
                                                   
59.   Charlie Savage & Adam Blinder, Reality Winner, N.S.A. Contractor Accused in Leak, 
Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/reality-winner-
nsa-leak-guilty-plea.html [https://perma.cc/8P75-5AES]. 
60.   Michael S. Schmidt, 6 Takeaways from the James Comey Memos, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/20/us/politics/comey-memos-takeaways.html 
[https://perma.cc/MBL4-6FB2]. 
61.   Id. 
62.   Id. 
63.   Savage & Blinder, supra note 60. 
64.   Savage & Blinder, supra note 60. 
65.   Savage & Blinder, supra note 60. 
66.   Charlie Savage & Mitch Smith, Ex-Minneapolis F.B.I. Agent Is Sentenced to 4 Years in 
Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/us/politics/terry-albury-
fbi-sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/DGE9-Z6VS]. 


















handing down the sentence, Judge Wright recognized Albury’s good 
intentions but labeled his actions “a fool’s errand” that “put our country at 
risk.”68 Soon after Albury was indicted, the DOJ charged Adam Shulte, a 
former C.I.A. software engineer, under the Act for allegedly leaking agency 
hacking tools to Wikileaks in what is known as the Vault 7 hack.69 Although 
this case has not yet been resolved, Shulte faces thirty years in prison on the 
Espionage Act charges.70 
In May 2019, Daniel Everette Hale became the fourth person to be 
charged under the Act by the Trump DOJ for allegedly leaking classified 
information regarding the U.S. Government’s  use of military drones to an 
online news outlet widely reported to be The Intercept.71 The Hale case is 
potentially important since his defense team argued that the Espionage Act 
violates the First Amendment.72 Hale claimed that the court should overrule 
the holding in Morrison because that holding was based at least in part on a 
factual finding that the Espionage Act did not pose a significant danger to 
journalistic activity.73 Hale and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press as amici argue that the recent proliferation in Espionage Act 
prosecutions against media leakers is evidence that the Act does in fact 
significantly affect journalistic activities and therefore Morrison should be 
overruled.74 
The most recent Espionage Act prosecution is that of Henry Kyle Frese, 
a Pentagon counterterrorism analyst who allegedly leaked information 
                                                   
68.   Id. 
69.   Adam Goldman, New Charges in Huge C.I.A. Breach Known as Vault 7, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/us/politics/charges-cia-breach-vault-
7.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/6FUJ-9CN8]. 
70.   In addition to the Espionage Act charges, Shulte was also charged with child pornography 
offenses stemming from images found on his laptop during the leak investigation. Press Release, U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, Joshua Adam Schulte Charged With the Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified 
Information and Other Offenses Relating to the Theft of Classified Material from the Central Intelligence 
Agency (June 18, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/joshua-adam-schulte-charged-
unauthorized-disclosure-classified-information-and-other [https://perma.cc/7HXE-SD9U]. 
71.  Adam Goldman, Ex-Intelligence Analyst Charged With Leaking Information to a Reporter, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/politics/daniel-hale-leak-
intercept.html [https://perma.cc/CW3A-9VAV]. Hale is the third Intercept source prosecuted under the 
Act by the Trump Administration. Both Winner and Albury also allegedly leaked documents to The 
Intercept, a news organization that was founded in the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures.  
72.   Def’s Mot. To Dismiss the Indictment, United States v. Hale, No. 1:10-cr-59 (Sept. 16, 
2019). 
73.   See id. at 25 n.32.  
74.   Id.; Brief of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press as Amicus Curiae at 19, United 
States v. Hale (No. 1:19-cr-59). 

















concerning Chinese ballistic missile defenses in the South China Sea to 
multiple reporters, one of which was his girlfriend.75 The Frese investigation 
employed a wiretap, an intrusive technique rarely used in leak 
investigations, which is evidence of the Trump DOJ’s determination to 
prosecute leakers through all available means.76 Frese was charged with two 
counts of willful transmission of national defense information, which carries 
a potential total sentence of twenty years.77 He pled guilty and was 
sentenced to 30 months in prison.78 
In addition to the five Espionage Act prosecutions detailed above, the 
Trump administration has also brought charges against leakers in three other 
cases under other statutes. In June 2018, James A. Wolfe, a Senate 
Intelligence Committee aide, was charged with making false statements to 
investigators about contacts that he had with reporters.79 Wolfe allegedly 
leaked details of the Committee’s investigation into Russian interference in 
U.S. elections, including the investigation into former Trump campaign aide 
Carter Page.80 Although Wolfe was not prosecuted under the Act and 
received a comparatively light two month sentence,81 the case provides 
further evidence of the politicization of leak investigations. Additionally, 
during the investigation into Wolfe, the Department of Justice seized the 
communications records of journalist Ali Watkins who had published 
                                                   
75.   Katie Benner, Pentagon Analyst is Charged in Leaks of Classified Reports, N.Y. TIMES 
(last updated Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/us/politics/kyle-frese-classified-
leaks.html [https://perma.cc/58VL-2ERE]. 
76.   Id.; Rachel Weiner, Intelligence analyst accused of leaking classified information let out 




77.   Press Release, Office of Public Affairs [or Dept. of Justice], Defense Intelligence Agency 
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stories based on the leaks.82 This appears to be the first instance of the 
Trump administration obtaining a journalist’s records, a practice that the 
DOJ normally avoids due to First Amendment concerns.83 
Two more recent leak cases were brought under bank secrecy laws 
rather than the Espionage Act.84 The first charges were brought against 
Natalie Mayflower Sours Edwards, a Treasury Department employee, for 
allegedly leaking details of suspicious financial transactions involving 
former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort.85 The second case 
involved an I.R.S. employee, John C. Fry, who allegedly leaked bank 
records related to former President Trump’s former lawyer Michael D. 
Cohen.86 All three of these non-Espionage Act prosecutions were brought 
against leakers who supplied information to the press about former 
President Trump’s inner circle and Robert Mueller’s investigation into the 
2016 election. Even though the penalties in these cases were less severe, the 
prosecutions themselves evince the DOJ’s determination to go after leakers, 
specifically those who appear to be acting against the Trump 
administration’s best interests. 
 
D. The Assange Indictment 
 
It is against this backdrop of increased leak prosecutions that the 
government began the prosecution against Julian Assange, the founder of 
Wikileaks, an organization dedicated to publishing information regarding 
the clandestine activities of powerful governments around the world. The 
Obama administration reportedly considered prosecuting Assange in the 
aftermath of the Wikileaks’ release of the Afghanistan War Logs, a trove of 
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U.S. military documents that cataloged abuses by the U.S. military abroad.87 
Although the Obama administration refrained from prosecuting Assange, 
the Trump administration has exhibited no such restraint. Assange was 
initially indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia on March 6, 2018 for 
allegedly conspiring with Chelsea Manning, the War Logs leaker, to hack a 
classified U.S. military computer network.88 The original indictment, which 
was unsealed on April 11, 2018, did not charge Assange under the 
Espionage Act, but rather focused on Assange’s alleged attempts to assist 
Manning in hacking a password in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 317 (conspiracy 
to defraud the United States) and 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (computer fraud).89 
The DOJ did not stop there and went on to issue a superseding 
indictment on May 23, 2019 charging Assange with 18 counts, including 
charges under § 793(g) (conspiracy to receive national defense 
information), § 793(b) (obtaining national defense information), § 793(c) 
(obtaining national defense information), § 793(d) (disclosure of lawfully 
obtained national defense information), and § 793(e) (disclosure of 
unlawfully obtained national defense information).90 The superseding 
indictment alleged that through Wikileaks, Assange actively solicited 
classified information, aided and abetted Manning in obtaining classified 
information, and subsequently published classified information containing 
unredacted names of human intelligence sources.91 In remarks regarding the 
superseding indictment, Department of Justice officials stated that the 
indictment was not a threat to press freedoms since Assange was “no 
journalist,” and because the publication charges focused on the narrow 
category of information that revealed the identities of human sources.92 
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However, multiple commentators have argued that the evidence of criminal 
activity charged in the indictment, such as using encrypted messaging 
platforms to communicate with sources, providing secure drop boxes to 
facilitate the disclosure of classified information, and pressing sources to 
reveal more information is activity that cannot be separated from traditional 
journalistic activities.93 
Although the first superseding indictment remains the most important 
and problematic aspect of the Assange case, there have been two additional 
developments that could influence how the case proceeds and its potential 
consequences for press freedoms. On June 24, 2020 the Department of 
Justice issued a second superseding indictment against Assange which 
purportedly “broaden[s] the scope of the conspiracy surrounding alleged 
computer intrusions with which Assange was previously charged.”94 
Although this new indictment does detail Assange’s role in allegedly 
conspiring with hackers to steal documents, it does not substantially modify 
the previous indictment or add more charges.95 
Lastly, on January 4, 2021 Judge Baraitser of the Westminster 
Magistrates’ Court ruled that Assange cannot be extradited to the United 
States, citing mental health concerns and the risk of potential suicide.96 
However, the ruling focused narrowly on health grounds and did not 
endorse the defense’s arguments on the politically motivated nature of the 
prosecution and its potential impact on free speech.97 Subsequently, Judge 
Baraitser denied Assange’s request for bail, deeming him a flight risk, and 
requiring him to remain in the Belmarsh prison until the conclusion of 
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proceedings.98 Since the U.S. has declared its intention to appeal the 
extradition ruling, Assange will likely remain in Belmarsh for some time.99 
 
E. Historical Institutionalism  
 
Because the remainder of this Note will apply the analytical tools of 
Historical Institutionalism (“HI”), it is necessary to explain how this 
framework has developed and how it works it practice. While political 
scientists have long recognized the impact that institutions have on society, 
the birth of “new institutionalism” has created more precise frameworks for 
analyzing the birth and development of institutions.100 Of the three “new 
institutionalisms,” rational choice, sociological, and historical, historical 
institutionalism is unique in its emphasis on the temporal aspect of 
institutional development.101  
The two main concepts that inform historical institutionalist analysis are 
critical juncture and path dependence. Political Science literature defines a 
critical juncture as “a period of significant change, which typically occurs 
in distinct ways in different countries . . . and which is hypothesized to 
produce distinct legacies.”102 In identifying a particular juncture as critical, 
historical institutionalists look for two key characteristics: the probability 
jump and the temporal aspect.103 The probability jump measures the 
probability of a certain outcome occurring before the critical juncture as 
opposed to the probability of the same outcome occurring after the 
juncture.104 The temporal aspect is simply the amount of time involved in a 
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juncture compared to the length of the path that the juncture facilitates.105 
Basically, a juncture is at its most critical when there is a high probability 
jump combined with a short juncture and a long path.  
Path dependence, although originally developed in the field of 
economics, is the concept through which historical institutionalists explain 
how institutions and institutional behavior persist, even after they are no 
longer efficient or after the conditions giving rise to the institution or 
behavior no longer exist.106 Path dependence can be understood as a self-
reinforcing process, where institutional change creates positive feedback for 
the political actors embedded within an institution, making it increasingly 
difficult to deviate from the existing path over time.107 Taken together, 
critical juncture and path dependence allow historical institutionalists to 
analyze why institutions take the shape that they do and why institutional 
actors behave in certain ways. I will now attempt to use these analytical 
tools to examine the potential impact of the current period on the future 
institutional behavior of the Department of Justice regarding prosecutions 
under the Espionage Act. 
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This section begins with a legal analysis of the Assange Indictment, 
which will demonstrate why the charges leveled against Assange cannot be 
differentiated from traditional journalistic activities. I will then attempt to 
use the HI toolkit to show the potential impacts of the Assange Indictment 
on the precarious equilibrium between First Amendment protections and 
national security. 
 
A. The Indictment and Journalistic Activity 
 
Although the Department of Justice has attempted to frame Assange and 
Wikileaks as operating outside the scope of journalism,108 the charges in the 
indictment fail to differentiate Assange’s behavior from that of traditional 
national security journalists. Notably, the argument that the charges in the 
original March 6, 2018 indictment are separable from traditional journalistic 
activities is a plausible one. The original indictment centered around an 
alleged conspiracy between Assange and Manning to crack a password on 
a secure DOD computer.109 Assange allegedly assisted Manning in cracking 
a password that would have allowed Manning to cover her tracks by 
accessing the classified DOD documents under another username.110 
Although the original indictment was concerning to some press freedom 
advocates because it seemingly criminalized the act of obscuring a source’s 
identity, the specifically alleged act of hacking a password on a DOD 
computer certainly falls outside the purview of mainstream investigative 
journalism.111 Conversely, the activity cited in the first superseding 
indictment cannot be differentiated from traditional journalistic activity, 
and the second superseding indictment does not alter the crux of the pure 
publication112 allegations contained in the first superseding indictment.113 
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The government has put forth three lines of reasoning in an attempt to 
differentiate Assange and Wikileaks from traditional journalism outlets. 
The first government line of reasoning contends that Assange is “no 
journalist”114 and therefore the indictment is not an attack on the press. 
Although reasonable minds can disagree about the validity of Assange’s 
methods, whether he is or is not a journalist bears no relation to the charges 
alleged in the superseding indictment.115 This is largely because the 
Espionage Act makes no mention of journalism or the press, but instead 
criminalizes the act of communicating classified information without regard 
for the medium used for such a communication.116 Similarly, the First 
Amendment applies to everyone, including non-citizens, regardless of their 
journalistic credentials.117 Therefore, the fact that the current Department of 
Justice (and many commentators) do not classify Assange as a journalist is 
irrelevant when considering the First Amendment implications of the 
superseding indictment. 
The government’s second line of reasoning attempts to differentiate 
Assange from traditional journalistic outlets because he published the 
names of U.S. allies and informants, thereby putting lives at risk.118 
Importantly, the text of the Act does not discriminate between redacted and 
unredacted information, but rather refers only to documents “relating to the 
national defense, or information relating to the national defense which 
information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury 
of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.”119 In 
previous Espionage Act cases, including the recent prosecution of Reality 
Winner, the government has successfully argued that this phrase should be 
broadly construed to include essentially any information that the 
government deems harmful to national security, and not be limited to 
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information that puts informants or allies at risk.120 Because the two 
rationales put forth by the government—that Assange is not a journalist and 
that he published unredacted documents—fail to differentiate the activity 
charged in the first superseding indictment from traditional journalistic 
activity, the indictment represents an unprecedented infringement on the 
freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
The government’s third line of reasoning, as reflected in the second 
superseding indictment, attempts to differentiate Assange from traditional 
journalists by emphasizing his hacker credentials and his conspiratorial 
interactions with other hackers. If the government were to rely solely on 
these interactions in court, this would limit the potential chilling effect since 
such actions are outside of mainstream journalistic activity. However, 
because Assange prevailed in his extradition hearing, he will likely never 
stand trial in the U.S. As a result, DOJ will likely never have to make the 
case before a court. Because we will likely never know how DOJ would 
have framed the case and because the first superseding indictment remains 
pending and unaltered, the second superseding indictment does not diminish 
it’s potential chilling effect.  
In attempting to establish a criminal conspiracy between Assange and 
Manning, the government cites as evidence two actions that are 
commonplace journalistic techniques. The first is Wikileaks’ use of Secure 
File Transfer Protocol (“SFTP”) technology to facilitate Manning’s leak of 
classified information. The use of SFTP technology is cited in paragraphs 
22 and 27 of the first superseding indictment as evidence that Assange and 
Wikileaks actively solicited classified disclosures.121 However, SFTP 
technology is indistinguishable from “secure drop,” a common tool used by 
The New York Times, The Washington Post, Al Jazeera, The Guardian and 
others to facilitate anonymous tips.122 In the digital age, it is important for 
journalistic outlets to be able to provide secure systems that protect a 
source’s identity in order to facilitate important, newsworthy stories. By 
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citing the use of this technology as evidence of a criminal conspiracy, the 
superseding indictment sets a dangerous precedent that will undoubtably 
hinder the ability of news organizations to perform vital investigative 
journalism in the future. 
The second action cited by the government as evidence of a criminal 
conspiracy is Assange’s remark to Manning that “curious eyes never run 
dry.”123 The indictment alleges that this comment was intended to 
“encourage Manning to continue her theft of classified documents . . . ”124 
However, in the course of reporting a story, journalists will often ask for 
additional documents or information from sources in order to vet a story for 
accuracy, provide more context for the story, or assess the potential national 
security impacts of the story.125 Assange’s remark falls far short of direct 
solicitation of classified information, but is rather a classic example of 
source cultivation, a widespread journalistic practice. By citing this vague 
remark as evidence of a criminal conspiracy, the government injects a new 
obstacle into the journalist-source relationship that may well make it more 
difficult for journalists to accurately report on matters of national security.  
The distinctions that the government attempts to draw between Assange 
and mainstream journalism fail to ameliorate the First Amendment concerns 
raised by the superseding indictment. Counts 15-17 of the indictment charge 
Assange with direct violations of § 793(e), the “pure publication” section of 
the Act. Neither the government’s assertion that Assange is “no journalist” 
nor the government’s argument about unredacted identifying information 
succeed in legally differentiating Assange from traditional journalists. 
Similarly, the evidence that the government cites as establishing a criminal 
conspiracy between Assange and Manning to violate the Act risks 
criminalizing widely used journalism tools and methods. 
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B. A Critical Juncture 
 
The current period represents a critical juncture that will determine the 
future relationship between the First Amendment and national security. As 
discussed above, the two factors that characterize a critical juncture are the 
temporal aspect and the probability jump. This section will analyze the 
current period in terms of these two factors. 
The temporal aspect should be examined in terms of the history of the 
institution in question. As discussed in the history section above, there has 
essentially been 100 years of interaction between the Department of Justice 
and the press under the auspices of the Espionage Act. The first historical 
period, during World War I, saw an extreme number of cases brought under 
the original formulation of the Act in a manner that is incompatible with our 
modern conception of the First Amendment. The second historical period, 
from the end of the World War I up until 2009, was characterized by a 
reluctance on the part of the government to use the Act in way that would 
affect the First Amendment. The third historical period, from 2009 through 
the present day has seen a drastic increase in Espionage Act prosecutions 
brought against whistleblowers. Even during this upswing in prosecutions, 
there has never been an Espionage Act charge brought against a third-party 
based purely on the publication of national defense information.126  
The Assange prosecutions threaten to distort the precarious equilibrium 
between national security and the press which has been in place relatively 
intact since the end of World War I. The Obama era prosecution of 
whistleblowers (which continued under Trump) has certainly affected this 
ecosystem by imposing harsher penalties on leakers, thereby making 
potential leakers think twice before blowing the whistle on potentially 
newsworthy stories. On some level, the tactic of going after leakers makes 
sense for the government. In the digital age, large media companies no 
longer have a monopoly on the information that reaches the public. Before 
the internet, the government was generally able to halt the publication of 
potentially damaging national security information by the press through 
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negotiations with the newspapers or television stations that had possession 
of the damaging information. The internet changed this dynamic by 
democratizing the ability to broadcast information to the public through 
blogs and social media. Because the government no longer has the ability 
to halt publication once the leak has occurred, it has turned to prosecutions 
to disincentivize the act of leaking in the first place. These prosecutions have 
surely had an effect on the ecosystem of leaks; but it is impossible to tell 
exactly how large the impact has been. Because the logic of the Assange 
indictment could potentially apply to a large variety of news organizations 
that publish stories based on classified information, a successful prosecution 
of Assange or the continued looming presence of the first superseding 
indictment would significantly alter this already fragile ecosystem. 
The question remains: why is this happening now? This is the 
probability due to jump factor, which can be explained by examining current 
events. The current period represents a perfect storm, which allowed the 
Trump administration to pursue a prosecutorial policy that previous 
administrations avoided. The first factor relates to Assange himself. It is 
hard to imagine a less sympathetic case for press freedom advocates. Not 
only did Assange make the ethically questionable decision to publish these 
stories unredacted, he has also been charged with sexual assault in 
Sweden127 and is widely disparaged for his controversial role in the 2016 
election.128 The indictment also comes at a time when faith in the media has 
never been lower.129 Former President Trump repeatedly labelled the media 
as “the enemy of the people,”130 and the public has grown increasingly 
frustrated with mainstream media outlets over supposed “fake news.” This 
lack of confidence in the media combined with the peculiar nature of the 
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Assange case allowed the Trump administration to take action that would 
have previously been politically untenable.  
 
III.  PROPOSAL 
 
In order to end this critical juncture and head down a more reasonable 
path, we must take decisive action now. This action must come from either 
the federal judiciary or Congress. There are potential executive actions that 
could deescalate the present situation, but this does not seem likely. Even if 
the executive branch were to decide to drop the charges against Assange, 
the legal frameworks that allow the government the discretion to bring such 
charges would remain in place. My proposal details two potential actions, 
one by the judiciary and one by Congress, that could potentially reestablish 
a more balanced equilibrium between the First Amendment and the 
government’s national security interests. 
Firstly, Congress could amend the Espionage Act. The easiest and most 
effective fix would be to simply eliminate § 793(e) altogether. Although this 
may seem like a drastic action, it would be unlikely to hinder the ability of 
the government to prosecute the vast majority of Espionage Act cases. For 
instance, in the Assange case the government could still bring charges under 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as well as conspiracy charges under the 
other sections of the Espionage Act. Even without § 793(e) at its disposal, 
the government could still effectively prosecute rogue journalists who go 
beyond journalistic norms and take concrete steps to aid and abet leakers. 
Additionally, the government could still prosecute malicious actors by 
imposing inchoate liability under the other sections of the Act such as § 
793(d). By eliminating the pure publication portion of the Act, § 793(e), and 
leaving intact the unauthorized disclosure portions of the Act such as § 
793(d), Congress would continue to allow the executive to protect national 
security while significantly decreasing infringement on the First 
Amendment. 
Even if Congress does not take action, the judiciary could interpret the 
Act in a way that would minimize its First Amendment implications. As 
noted above, courts have repeatedly refused to rule specific sections of the 
Act unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. However, these prior rulings 
would not be binding if the Assange case or another pure publication case 


















could change a court’s overbreadth calculation, as any case involving media 
publication would necessarily sweep in more potential speech than any 
previous case. Even if the courts were to uphold the constitutionality of the 
Act, a court could alleviate First Amendment concerns by applying a 
balancing test similar to the test established by the Supreme Court in 
Pickering v. Board of Education.131 In Pickering, a case involving a public 
school teacher and speech critical of the government, the Court balanced a 
teacher’s right to discuss matters of public interest with the state’s legitimate 
interest in promoting efficiency in public services.132 In pure publication 
cases brought under § 793(e), courts could employ a similar test that would 
balance the public interest value of the speech against its potential harm to 
national security. Courts could go through each count charged under § 
793(e) and determine whether the particular speech in question is in the 
public interest and whether this interest outweighs any potential national 
security harms. 
Although this balancing test would necessitate a more active role in 
national security cases, it should not be too difficult to implement. For 
instance, in the Assange case, the court would apply the test individually to 
counts 15, 16, and 17. For count 15, Assange’s defense lawyers would have 
to demonstrate the public interest in the specific document, which for count 
15, would be the significant activity logs from the war in Afghanistan. The 
prosecution would argue that the publication harmed national security 
because it named sources and put lives in danger. The court would then 
repeat the process for count 16 regarding Iraq war logs and count 17 
evaluating the state department cables. By allowing the defense to argue for 
speech in the public interest, the court would significantly reduce the First 
Amendment impact of § 793(e). In Assange’s case, such a balancing test 
would be unlikely to favor Assange because of his publication decisions. 
However, in a case where publication is clearly in the public interest and 
does not significantly harm national security, such as the Reality Winner 
case, such a balancing test would likely favor the freedom of the press. 
 
                                                   
131.  Pickering v. Board of Ed. 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see Our Gym Was Named for the 
Espionage Act Guy???, THE NAT. SEC. LAW PODCAST (May 28, 2019), 
https://www.nationalsecuritylawpodcast.com/episode-123-our-gym-was-named-for-the-espionage-act-
guy/ [https://perma.cc/5DRW-DK4Q] (discussing Pickering balancing test in the Espionage Act 
context).   
132.   Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 



















When the government unveiled the superseding indictment charging 
Assange under §  
793(e) of the Espionage Act, the balance between the First Amendment 
and the government’s interest in protecting national security entered a 
critical juncture. Neither the government’s assertion that Assange is “no 
journalist,” the indictment’s focus on unredacted information, nor the 
government’s attempt to link Assange with hacking is sufficient to legally 
distinguish the case against Assange from other traditional journalistic 
national security reporting. Furthermore, the specific actions cited in the 
indictment, including the use of secure drop technology and Assange’s 
alleged solicitation of further documents from Manning, criminalize 
common journalistic methods. In order to prevent a significantly altered 
equilibrium between national security and the First Amendment, Congress 
or the courts must take action. In the legislative arena, Congress could 
potentially amend the Act by eliminating § 793(e), which would alleviate 
First Amendment concerns while preserving the government’s ability to 
prosecute whistleblowers and journalists who significantly aid and abet 
classified leaks. Alternatively, the courts could step in and implement a 
balancing test for § 793(e) cases that would weigh the public interest in 
publication against any potential national security concerns. Additionally, 
the incoming Biden Administration could drop the charges against Assange, 
although such an action would not cure the First Amendment defects 
inherent in the Act. If no action is taken during this critical juncture, the 
United States risks crippling the First Amendment freedoms of journalists 
and publishers who inform the public of matters vital to the functioning of 
our democracy. 
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